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ABSTRACT 
 
In the present essay we introduce the concept of macroculture as a complex of 
mutually supporting values, norms and beliefs in various areas of human activity, like 
war, religion, politics, athletics, etc. in a model. Then, by applying the concept of 
bounded rationality, we analyse how some macrocultures that are favorable or the 
‘precondition’ for the emergence of democracy and institutions develop, in particular 
property rights, that foster economic development. We analyze this for Bronze Age 
and Archaic Greece, as being the historical case where such a macroculture favorable 
to democracy and stable property rights first emerged. Our main findings indicate that 
during Mycenaean and Archaic age period, the emergence of various elements of 
macroculture, in warfare, religion, city-state environment and athletic games evolved 
into similar proto-democratic values leading to the establishment of democracy as a 
political phenomenon in Classical Greece. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 In the present essay we introduce the concept of macroculture in order to 
analyse the conditions that shape long run economic structural and political change. 
We examine as our case study Bronze Age and Archaic Greek religion in relation to 
property rights, democratic elements and a general set of values that favors economic 
change and growth and, related to it, the emergence of democracy.  
  The emergence of direct democracy in 6
th
 century B.C. Archaic Greece has 
been of continuing interest to philosophers, sociologists, historians and economists 
since at least the fourth century B.C. with Plato's Republic and Aristotle’s Politics. It 
had a negative connotation through much of history linked to the negative view cast 
on it by Plato and to a lesser extent by Aristotle till the 17
th
 century. Interest in 
democracy, seen in a favorable light this time, revived with the reemergence of some 
democratic forms of government throughout Europe as if the cases of thirteen century 
Swiss Confederation (after 1291), some medieval cities in northern Italy like Florence 
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(Greif, 2005: 771-775), were a series of statutory laws known as ‘the Ordinances of 
Justice’ was enacted between the years 1293 and 1295, and in southern Germany 
Augsburg.           
 Further introduction of proto-democracy was introduced during the 17
th
 
century in England (after the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of December 1688 established 
continuous Parliaments) and the United Provinces (Dutch Republic).
1
 This interest 
gained strength during the so called ‘Enlightenment’ of the 18th century through the 
writings of Montesquieu, Locke, Rousseau, Voltaire, Hume, and in the 19
th
 century 
with James and John Stuart Mill etc, who were among the first prominent members of 
the classical economic thought. 
During recent decades analysis has focused also on the causal links between 
democracy (both representative and direct) and the economy, economic institutions 
and economic performance. In the present paper we will discuss the concept of 
macroculture, as an environment of religion, politics, war, economics etc. that shapes 
particular norms, rules, values and beliefs. Then, using the concept of bounded 
rationality, we will discuss how this set of values etc. that has emerged in one of the 
mutually interdepended and reinforcing elements of a macroculture is diffused into 
others, for example from the religious domain and war into the fields of politics and 
economics.           
 Analysing as a case study Bronze Age and Archaic Greece, we argue that a set 
of values and norms developed within the religious domain and in warfare that was 
favorable as a precondition both for the emergence of a democratic form of 
government, and for institutions guaranteeing stable property rights that again 
favoured and were a precondition for economic development. 
 
2. Religion and Politics 
 
 After the collapse of the bipolar international system in 1989-1990, there has 
been an upsurge in looking towards religious factors as relevant to international 
politics, as for example (Huntington, 1997). He, along with numerous other authors, 
e.g. Harrison and Huntington (2001), found that religion is a defining force in shaping 
the institutions, moral laws and identities of a society, a discussion which has been 
continuous since Weber’s Protestant Ethic thesis. In our essay, we do not intend to 
take a stand on the ongoing controversy, but to pose a related question about whether 
and how religion influences politics and the economy, in particular property rights, 
which according to a long line of scholars (e.g. Anderson, 2009; North, 1990, 1981, 
1978) are basic for the institutional framework that fosters or inhibits economic 
growth.
2
 
                                                 
1 The United Provinces (UP) were not a true democracy in today’s sense where universal voting rights 
for all citizens exist, nor was 17
th
 (and later) England and the United Kingdom after England’s union 
with Scotland in 1707. But the UP had established some proto-democratic institutions, in the ‘federal 
level’ of the union, e.g. the election of the Estates General (the union’s ‘Parliament’) where each 
province had one vote and where unanimity was required for taking a decision on behalf of the Union 
as a whole. It has been aptly called a ‘democratic head on an oligarchic body’. For details of the 
politics and economics of the UP, see Kyriazis (2006) and references there in.  
2
 For over a century since its first series of essays in 1905, Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism (1905, 1930) has led to discussion and controversy among sociologists, historians, and 
economists. Weber's book appeared first in English translated by Parsons, and followed by numerous 
other editions, e.g. Charles Scribner and Sons (1958) and George Allen and Unwin (1976). For recent 
reviews, see among others Hamilton (1995), Davids (2008) and Schaltegger and Torgler (2009).  For 
institutional settings that inhibit growth, North (1981) analyses the 16
th
 century Spanish Mesta (guild of 
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 Taking as our historic case study Mycenaean and Archaic ancient Greece we 
ask whether religion influenced the development of democracy and property rights. 
We analyse the ancient sources in order to trace the existence of elements that point 
out to a democratic framework or state of mind among ancient Greeks. Then, again 
the question of causality arises: If such a mindset exists, did it influence politics, or 
was religion, as illustrated accordingly to the extant sources, a mirror-image of the 
real world? Did the ancient Greeks attribute to their gods their actual practices, or did 
the practices they attributed to their gods influence later on their political life? This is 
a difficult question, and the answer depends on the interpretation of the evidence, but 
also on establishing the chronology of sources and events. For the earliest periods, eg. 
the Early Bronze Age in Crete and the Cyclades about 2800-1600 B.C., and down to 
the beginning of the Archaic period (beginning during the late 9
th
, early 8
th
 century 
B.C.), we do not have extant written sources (apart from bookkeeping tablets 
recovered from Cretan and Mycenaean palaces, such as those of Pylos and Knossos) 
and thus, we have to rely on archaeological finds and on later sources. 
 For the Archaic period (9
th
-6
th
 centuries B.C.) we have written sources 
(beginning at the late-8
th
 century with Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey and Hesiod’s 
Theogony and Works and Days that permit us inferences on Greek religious beliefs. In 
these, as we analyse in the third part of our essay, we can trace both proto-democratic 
elements and thoughts concerning the working of the economy and the influence from 
religion to politics. Democratic elements in religion pre-existed the actual introduction 
of direct democracy, which emerged in various parts of Greece during the sixth 
century and in the city-state of Athens definitely through Cleisthenes with his 
institutional reforms in 510-507 B.C. (Ober, 2008; Raauflaub et. al., 2007; Tridimas, 
2011). 
 At least since Jacobsen (1943) authors have investigated ancient religions in 
order to discover (or dismiss) elements of democracy.
3
 Before analyzing further the 
Greek case we summarize the arguments on the actual discussion: First, it seems that 
some forms of public assemblies existed in many ancient societies, linked also to the 
city-states cultures. But although many city-state cultures existed in many parts of the 
world, for example, the Sumerian cities of Uruk, Ur and Lagash of ancient 
Mesopotamia (in 3500-2200 B.C.), the Phoenician city-states of Arados, Byblos, 
Sidon and Tyre (Hansen, 1999), or Jewish cities such as Jerusalem (Wolf, 1947), or 
finally, the Warring State period China (in 475-221 B.C.)  and much later (Yates, 
1999), they did not necessarily lead to a democratic form of government.  
 Walton (1995) contests the view that this system of government was even a 
primitive form of democracy, seeing it as being more a ‘public sounding board’ or a 
consultive body. Such assemblies in all other cases except for Greece were introduced 
inside absolutist-centralist types of governments, kingships and empires. Democratic 
elements in all these primitive societies and states did not survive. Only in the Greek 
city-states (and, somewhat attenuated in the forms of republic instead of democracy, 
                                                                                                                                            
wool producers), while other authors Kennedy (1988), and Kyriazis (2008) analyse the Mogul empire 
of India, where nobles, provincial governors etc. did not have the right of inheritance. At their death, 
their personal fortune passed not to their heirs but to the emperor's treasury. This system led to 
exorbitant consumption and inhibited investment.   
3
 In this context authors such as Isakhan (2006) and Isakhan and Stockwell (2011) make a curious and 
we believe spurious argument. Seeing the difficulty that modern Islamic states such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan have in accepting democracy as a form of government, we should try to convince them 
that democratic forms of government are not a Western imposition on their societies, but a political and 
cultural innovation of their own past. Thus, by adopting democracy they would simply go back to their 
roots. 
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in Rome) emerges a democratic structure with democratic institutions and laws 
establishing the framework for the working of the state. Direct democracy was 
practiced in many Greek city-states for about three centuries, (Athens from 510-322 
B.C., Rhodes from 4
th
 to mid-2
nd
 century, the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues with 
interruption down to their conquest by Rome, in 146 B.C. (Cartledge, 2009).  
 In the next section, for analytical purposes we intend to introduce the concepts 
of macroculture (taken over from organization theory and adapted to a new model) 
and bounded rationality, which as far as we know, is a new methodological approach 
in this debate, in order to explain the emergence of democratic forms of government. 
 
3. Macroculture and Bounded Rationality 
 
In this section we introduce, for the first time as far as we know, the concept of 
macroculture (taken over and adapted from organization theory) into institutional 
economics in order to analyse structural change. A ‘macroculture’ encompasses the 
common values, norms and beliefs shared among members of a society or state.  In 
our adaptation of the term in economics and politics, macroculture has also a dynamic 
time characteristic, that of long term periods. As we will show in our case study, 
Bronze and Archaic Age period in Greece, the elements of macroculture take shape 
over time periods of decades to centuries.      
 Through these values, norms and beliefs, a macroculture guides actions and 
creates typical behaviour among independent entities, so that it coordinates their 
activities so that complex tasks may be completed (Abrahamson and Fombrun, 1992, 
1994; Jones et. al., 1997). This happens in three ways:  1) By creating ‘convergence of 
expectations’. 2) By allowing for idiosyncratic language to summarize complex 
routines and information and 3) By specifying broad tacitly understood rules for 
appropriate actions under unspecified contingencies (Camerer and Vepsalainen, 1988; 
Williamson, 1991, 1975). The establishment of ‘communication protocols’ follows.  
Jones et. al. (1997) have applied this concept to firms, while Almond and 
Verba (1963) have written on ‘civic culture’ as a shared set of beliefs among citizens. 
Putnam (1993) argues that democratic stability depends on specific forms of social 
organization and citizen values which he calls ‘civic traditions’. A similar line of 
argumentation (Granovetter, 1992:35) maintains that a structural embeddedness is 
developed: e.g., firms develop connected mutual contacts to one another. This 
corresponds to the establishment of mutual links or networks. These interactions 
define values and norms and thus strengthen this interdependence, the macroculture. 
This is consistent with Lazaric (2011: 148), who claims that ‘every recurrent 
interaction pattern in an organization may be hiding a potential routine’ as well as 
with Vromen (2011), who labels these mutual values, norms and patterns of behavior 
as ‘routines’ by depicting them as ‘multilevel mechanisms’ that generate firm 
behavior. 
Solow (1985) argues that economic activity is embedded in social institutions, 
customs and attitudes, while embededness of institutions in a historic and social 
context is a main idea of North’s work (Daunton, 2010; North 1990, 1981, 1978). In 
fact, this discussion of embeddedness is much older in the historical than in the 
organizational and economics context. It goes back to the ‘Bücher-Meyer controversy’ 
(the modernists versus the primitivists) concerning the ancient economy. (Amemiya, 
2007: 57-61; Morris, 1994; Schefold, 2010). It was taken up again by scholars such as 
5 
 
Polanyi (1957), Humphreys (1978) and Finley (1982)
4
 who argued that the ancient 
economy was embedded in the social, political and cultural context and so was 
primitive, a thesis that has been refuted by more recent studies concerning the 
economy, (Amemiya, 2007; Bitros and Karayannis, 2008; Cohen, 1997; Engen, 2005; 
Halkos and Kyriazis, 2010; Kyriazis, 2009; Lyttkens, 1997 and Ober, 2008, 2010  
among many others) who argue that the ancient Greek economy, and particularly that 
of Athens, functioned much like the market economies of today.
5
    
 Two particular questions on this issue are, first, how does such a macroculture 
develop and, second, do macrocultures proceed along different paths, evolving 
different characteristics? Related to this is the issue of ‘cause’ and effect. Do values 
and norms preexist (and if so, why and how did they come about) and do they shape a 
particular macroculture, or is it the other way round, that is, does a macroculture give 
rise to specific values and norms? Thus, an actual answer can be given only if we 
manage to establish chronological sequences of events.
6
     
 Kyriazis and Metaxas (2010) and Kyriazis and Paparrigopoulos (2011) have 
analyzed one aspect of macroculture and norms and values, the emergence of a new 
type of warrior in Archaic Greece, the hoplite (named from his big round shield, the 
‘hoplon’) and the new tactical formation, the phalanx, as coordination and 
cooperation mechanisms which give rise to specific mental attitudes, values and 
norms, even a specific language (e.g. clear commands for battle) and learning and 
knowledge. Even more, the new warship adopted during the early 5
th
 century by the 
Greeks, the trireme and the naval fleets, developed and fine-tuned the cooperation and 
coordination mechanism in the phalanx’s ‘customs’ values and norms. The next issue 
is why and how these norms and values are diffused from one sector of the 
macroculture into another, making it a coherent whole. 
 We believe that the answer can be found in the theory of bounded rationality. 
Simon (1991, 1982) developed the theory of bounded rationality, which states that the 
mind has limitations, for example in its capacity to absorb and use new information. 
We are not totally ‘rational’ in the sense of seeking to maximize utility or any other 
‘ideal’. What we actually do in real life is try to reach a solution that satisfies us even 
if it is not the best possible one. We may even ignore the best possible one that would 
maximize utility. Simon calls this behavior ‘satisficing’. Satisficing enables us to find 
acceptable solutions with minimal expenditure of time and effort, thus reducing 
transaction costs (as eg. information costs). Such a behaviour has further 
consequences: once we have found solutions to a particular problem that are 
perceived as adequate, when facing a new problem we try to use the established and 
known rules of the thumb, the known knowledge we possess, in order to solve the 
new problem.           
 This again reduces our effort and time consumed, which is important due to 
our brain's limited capacity. Only if we do not find an adequate solution using the 
                                                 
4
 Actually Finley did not use that label but argued a ‘substantivist’ (contextualized, embedded) position, 
so that the criticism of ‘modernists’ does not apply directly to him. We owe this remark to P. Cartledge 
in a personal communication to us. 
5
 To be more precise, there was no single ancient Greek economy in the sense of one integrated 
economy like todays, but regional economies, some with strong links to one another and some weaker 
ones. Athens, Corinth, Rhodes and a few other mainly maritime states come closer to the characteristics 
of modern economies (having also developed important financial ‘instruments’ like banks (but not yet 
investment instruments like todays) come close to ‘modern’ economies, while others, like Epirus and 
5
th
 century Macedon much less so. We again owe this qualification to P. Cartledge in a personal 
communication. 
6
  This point has been raised as a criticism against North by Daunton (2010). 
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existing knowledge and if the problem we face is serious enough, do we devote effort 
and time to find new solutions. Once we have found some solution, we have increased 
our total learning and knowledge. Satisficing behavior thus diffuses known solutions 
and problem solving rules to new problems. But it does so also for a set of values and 
norms evolved in one area which are diffused and taken over in other contexts.  
This is exactly how ‘macrocultures’ develop and are strengthened and this is 
what happened in ancient Greek city-states. The values and norms evolved in warfare 
through coordination and cooperation mechanisms, equality, cohesion, self-discipline 
and above all trust, representing a specific set of mind and morals, learning and 
knowledge were transferred from the military into the political field, where they 
became ‘isegoria’ (equality of speech), ‘isonomia’ (equality in front of the law) and 
‘omonoia’ (unanimity).7 Thus, to paraphrase the 4th century Athenian orator Demades, 
bounded rationality became the ‘cognitive glue’ that held the various elements of a 
macroculture together into a coherent whole.
8
  
 
4. A model of Path Dependence and Change 
 
Let us now formalize the emergence of new macrocultures that lead to 
economic and political change in the long-run. In figure 1 the path dependence and 
change of macrocultures is shown. Figure 1 illustrates the dynamic-structural change 
from one (old) macroculture to a different (new) one.
9
 
 
Figure 1. Transition from the old to the new macroculture 
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7
 Kyriazis and Metaxas (2010) present a formal model using bounded rationality in order to explain 
path dependence and change. As far as we know Kyriazis and Metaxas, (2010) and Kyriazis and 
Paparrigopoulos (2011) address for the first time the issues of the emergence of macroculture, values 
and norms in a historical context, that of Ancient Greece and their influence on the emergence of 
democracy. 
8
 Demades actually called ‘theorika’ (money paid to poorer Athenian citizens to enable them to watch 
the four days long theatrical contents, a form of public education) and ‘ekkleisiastika’ (money paid to 
enable them to participate in the Assembly, about 40 days per year during the 4
th
 century. See Hansen 
(1999), the ‘glue of democracy’ (Plut. Mor. 1070B). 
9
 The following model is a development of (Kyriazis, 2006; Kyriazis and Metaxas, 2010).  
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where: 
 
om: (old macroculture): signifies the old macroculture, a system of norms, values and 
customs etc. that characterize the economic, social and political field of a state and 
associated institutions and organizations. 
 
nm: (new macroculture): signifies the emerging new macroculture, where new norms, 
values, customs etc. are being created, developed and diffused, so that over time a 
break with the old path-macroculture is accomplished, and the state follows a new 
path. We consider curve nm following an exponential shape because when during 
each period the state follows the new path (nm), the probability of staying on the new 
path increases, and the probability of returning to the old path decreases, because 
during each subsequent step along the new path, the various elements of the new 
macroculture are being mutually reinforced and integrated into a whole. 
The model in Figure 1 can be described by two simple equations: 
 
m=om+nm•e(g(t)∙t)                                        (1) 
 
where:  
m: macroculture 
om: the old macroculture: the constant term  
nm: the new macroculture which predominates over time if  gt>0 
 
g(t)=f(k, d)                                                 (2) 
 
where:  
 
gt: the rate of change depending on the creation of new elements of macroculture and 
their speed of diffusion (adaptation by other sectors). 
k: knowledge 
d: rate of diffusion (of the macroculture effect) 
 
A further elaboration could be made for (2) equation. We analyse in the text 
how the new values are diffused, through the working of bounded rationality, from 
one area of a macroculture, to the others to form an interdependent and integrated 
whole. Having in mind that a process of a gradual structural socioeconomic 
conversion of a state can become feasible through the macroculture effect, we can 
move from an old regime to one that creates new organizations and institutions. For 
instance, the conversion of the Mycenaean warlord’s assemblies we describe next via 
the Homeric Epics and the existing scholarship, lead to fully developed democratic 
participation assemblies, like that of ancient Athens. We can describe this rate of 
change of ‘learning’ as depending on the rate of creation of new knowledge kt, and the 
rate of its diffusion d. 
So, the ultimate format of the macroculture equation might be: 
m=om+nm•e f(k, d) •t                                  (3)       
 
The conceptual framework presented in figure 1 can also be described by 
Table 1, which shows the conditional probabilities pn1, pn2……….pnt, that 
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characterize each step along the new macroculture regime depending on the result of 
the previous period, and 1-pn1, 1-pn2,….1-pnt the probabilities of a return to the old 
macroculture regime. Based on the previous analysis we have: 
pn1 < pn2 <
…….. 
< pnt-1 < pnt                      (4)        
 
1-pn1 > 1-pn2 >….. > 1-pnt-1 > 1-pnt        (5)        
 
 
Table 1: Decision Tree Probabilities 
Time Period: 1 2 t 
nm: new 
macroculture 
pn1 Pn2=(pn2)/pn1 Pnt=(pnt)/pnt-1 
om: old macroculture 1-pn1 1-pn2 1-pnt 
 
 
(4) and (5) have a logical explanation. For instance, pn1 < pn2. This is valid because, as 
we have shown in Figure 1, when during each period the state follows the new path 
(nm), the probability of staying into the new path (e.g. pn2) increases and is higher 
than the previous probability (e.g. pn1). So, it is clear that over time the probability of 
going back to the old macroculture (1-pnt) converges towards zero. 
In figure 2, we represent a decision tree, where the different elements of a 
macroculture (eg. religion, warfare, economy, politics etc.) are gradually being 
integrated into a new whole:  
 
Figure 2. Decision Tree and Integration of Various Elements of Macroculture 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                        1 
                                                                                               2                3                      nm 
                                                                                                         4                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                                                          
                                                                            
                                                                 
                     1                        2                        3                       4                                om 
time period: t 
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The cycles represent the various elements of a new macroculture that emerge 
in one sector at time period 1, thus representing new potential democratic knowledge 
in ‘politics’ and the emergence and gradual enforcement of individual property rights 
(taken together, the kt of equation 2). These cycles are reinforced through diffusion to 
other sectors at periods 2 and 3, and have been integrated into a new mutually 
supporting macroculture at period 4 through diffusion d of equation 2. According to 
our analysis in the next section, the various elements of a new macroculture appeared 
during the Archaic period in religion, warfare, the athletic games and the city-state 
environment, mutually reinforced each other, were integrated at the end of the period 
(towards the end of the 6th century) into a new macroculture that made the emergence 
of direct democracy in some cases a possibility (eighteen democratic states are 
attested for the end of the 6th century, and most notably Athens of Kleisthenes, 510-
507 B.C.) (Raauflaub et. al. 2007). 
The move from the old to the new macroculture in figure 2 represents political 
(towards democracy) and economic (towards property rights) structural change. In the 
following section, we will focus on one aspect of macroculture, religion and its values 
and norms in relation to politics and the economy in Bronze Age and Archaic Greece. 
 
5. The Bronze and Archaic Age Macroculture in Greece 
 
We turn now to the examination of two main issues of the Bronze Age (about 
3000, but mainly after 2000 B.C. to 1200 B.C) and the Archaic Age (about 800 to 500 
B.C.), property rights and democratic elements. The intermediate so called ‘Dark Age’ 
of Greece (about 1200 to 800 B.C.) is poor in material, both archaeological and 
written due to the Dorian invasion that caused the decline of the Mycenaean 
civilization. However, in contrast to scholars like Finley (1957), who believed that the 
Dorian invasion caused the dissolution of the socioeconomic and political status qvo 
in the Mycenaean Greece, more recent scholars like Foxhall (1995) have shown that 
Dark age period was not so ‘dark’ as it was thought to be, especially for those 
mycenaean city-states that they were not fully dependent on palatial economic 
organization. In accordance to Foxhall, van Effenderre (1985) found that the major 
political and economic relationships that dated back to Mycenaean period, like 
household organization and economic elite (aristocrats) behavior and practices, they 
did not abandoned, but took a different shape during the later archaic and classical 
period.
10
 
As we will further show in this part of the article by analyzing the Homeric 
epics and Hesiodic poems we can find many indications for the protection of property 
rights and for the implementation in practice of a set of democratic values and equal 
political rights during Bronze Age and Archaic periods in Greece as a whole. We do 
this because we think that ancient texts, as for example, the Greek Homeric epics and 
the Hesiod poems, though not always unquestionable, still provide us with invaluable 
information about the socioeconomic structure and the historical background of the 
states or nations we intend to focus on and thus can become useful tools for 
supporting our further research. 
 
 
                                                 
10
 In accordance to the findings of van Efferende (1985) and Foxhall (1995), P. Cartledge, in a personal 
communication to us argued that the older belief that the Dorian invasion caused the destruction of the 
Mycenaean civilization is not now generally accepted.  
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5.1 Property Rights 
 
 Homer's Iliad (mid-8
th
 century B.C.) begins with, in today’s terminology, a 
dispute about property rights cloaked in terms of ‘personal honour’. Agamemnon, 
king of Mycenae (Il. 1, 161-171) and war leader of the invading Greeks at Troy, has 
been obliged to relinquish a slavegirl which has been allotted to him after the sack of 
a city, because of Apollo's wrath. Being the supreme commander of the army, he feels 
that he is entitled to receive as part of his war loot, in compensation for his loss, 
another slave girl, Briseis, who had been attributed to Achilles, king of Pthia and 
mightiest champion of the Greeks. Achilles does give his slave girl to Agamemnon, 
neither in good grace nor in fear of him, but because he does not want to split the 
unity of the Greeks. But, aggrieved feeling dishonoured, he withdraws from the fight, 
which brings the Greeks great difficulties.  
From the above, it is clear that individuals (kings, aristocrats, and simple 
warriors) had property rights to the spoils of war (both humans and objects). These 
property rights served as incentives to motivate men to fight effectively (Frey and 
Buhofer, 1988). During the Trojan period (if we accept that Homer described the 
customs of war of about 1250 B.C., and not of those of his own age) these rights were 
clearly ascertained and denominated. Prisoners and objects were collected, and then 
distributed according to rules: First choice to the commander in chief (Agamemnon) 
and then in decreasing order according to merit and contribution to battle, thus second 
choice going to Achilles, the best warrior of all. Agamemnon then infringes on 
Achilles rights (an uncommon occurrence, hence the importance given to this event 
by Homer), but as a negative compensation, Achilles withdraws form battle and 
nobody can oblige him to participate in the war. The other kings try to persuade him, 
but cannot compel him. This is an example of proto-democratic procedures of consent 
building, of which the Iliad has many examples.     
 Proto-democratic in the sense that decisions, in this case to participate in 
battle, are not being taken by the ‘supreme commander’ giving orders to his 
subordinates, but each subordinate choosing on his own free will to participate or not 
in battle. Agamemnon is thus a ‘first among equals’, a position similar to that 
portrayed by Homer for Zeus among the gods. This again is a very different situation 
from those in Asian empires or Pharaonic Egypt, were the emperor (Sumerian, 
Babylonian, Assyrian, Hittite, Mede, Persian or Pharaoh) just commands.
11
  
 A very important point concerning the emerging property rights and justice 
macroculture is that a simple warrior, something of a popular speaker, Thersites, steps 
forward and takes part in the king's dispute, becoming the champion of the person 
whose property rights have been abused (Achilles) and the challenger of the party 
who has abused unjustly the established property rights, mainly Agamemnon but also 
other kings who support him, such as Odysseus (Il. 2. 210-241). Thus we think that 
Thersites can be seen as a member of a proto-jury made of persons of non-noble 
origin. The culmination of this proto-jury is the Athenian popular courts of the 
classical period, mainly after the reforms of Ephialtes, (that took place between 462-
461 B.C.) to 322 B.C., where the jurors were selected by lot among all Athenian 
citizens. 
 This thesis is consistent with Stuurman (2004: 173) who asserts that the 
Thersites episode indicates that ordinary warriors did not just obey blindly the orders 
of their commanders or kings but ‘warriors count for something’. Thus the Thersites 
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incident could be seen as a form of a proto-egalitarian behavior. Thersites is then 
punished for his impudent words by a hit from Odysseus, who considers him as guilty 
of calumny (Il. 2. 246-265). Still, what makes this episode remarkable and different 
from other contemporary cultures is that such a stand by a simple soldier, would be 
unthinkable in front of a Middle Eastern emperor or a Pharaoh, and that his 
punishment is extremely light, just a single hit.
12
  
The issue of property rights and justice (to safeguard them) continues. 
Odysseus counsels Agamemnon (Il. 19. 181-183) to be a just King and to give justice 
to those he has wronged, meaning Achilles. Agamemnon (Il. 19. 185-189, 247-248.) 
accepts his earlier mistake and makes amends to Achilles: He gives him, among 
others, as a compensation, gold of ten talents.
13
 Later, (Il. 21. 101-102) we come back 
to the attribution of property rights: Achilles by responding to a Trojan noble named 
Lykaon says that he has spared the lives of many Trojan captives whom he did not 
kill, but sold as slaves in foreign lands. From this, we can make two deductions:  
 First, here there is a direct granting of the spoils of war to the individual who 
secures them (Frey and Buhofer, 1988), a procedure different from that followed in 
the case of the two slavegirls (Agamemnon has not captured them personally but 
receives the first as a reward in his capacity as ‘supreme commander’). Second, 
selling them in foreign lands seems to be an indication of the functioning of markets. 
Has Homer portrayed a 13th century practice, or one of his own 8th century? Further, 
the existence of property rights in plots of land is attested. The world ‘kleros’ means a 
plot of land that belongs to the chief of a family. Hector says to the Trojans that, even 
if they are killed, their sacrifice will not have been in vain, because they will 
safeguarded their homes and ‘kleros’. It seems that even foreigners had the right to 
own land, while fallow land that a person cultivated became his property (Finley, 
1982).
14
 
 Homer's Odyssey also gives some information on property rights. Here again, 
there is an ambiguity as to whether the period concerned is the Mycenaean (during 
which Odysseus lived, about 1280-1260 B.C. or his own mid-8th century Archaic 
period. In Book 1 (Od. 1. 160) Telemachus speaking to a foreign guest castigates the 
suitors of his mother Penelope, ‘who waste foreign goods’. This makes clear the 
existence of established property rights, which should not be violated by third parties 
like the suitors. Further, in Od. 1. 402-404 one of the suitors, Eurymachus, answers to 
Telemachus arguing that Telemachus has undeniable property rights to his house and 
farm lands. In Od. 2. 333-336 the suitors discuss what to do with Odysseus’s house 
and the movables agreeing that they should take and distribute them among 
themselves, but the house itself should remain the property of Penelope.   
 This indicates that the property rights to houses could not be violated, and very 
importantly, women such as Penelope could own houses as their own property, 
something that was possible in some classical Greek city-states later on, for example 
Sparta and Gortyn on Crete (Fleck and Hansen, 2009) but not, at least de jure (but 
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 For an analysis of the various interpretations of the Thersites incident see Stuurman (2004). 
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It is not exactly clear what kind of talent Homer has in mind here. It could be either a measure of 
weight, or simply of value. During 8
th
 century B.C., when Iliad was written, no coins were yet in 
circulation in Greece. Thus, a silver talent would not yet have a monetary value as it did later, as in 
classical Athens, when a talent was the equivalent of 6000 drachmae, the cost of  building a trireme 
warship was one talent (Lyttkens,  2008: 10; Ober, 2008) and the daily wage of a worker in 480’s was 
less than a drachma (Kyriazis and Zouboulakis, 2004). Still, the talents offered to Achilles must have 
represented an enormous value. 
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 According to Foxhall (1997: 128) ‘some notion of private property was at the heart of Greek 
concepts of land tenure well back into the dim and distant past’. 
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probably yes de facto, in Athens) (Cohen, 1997). Odyssey gives some additional 
information on trade and the exchange of goods, which again presupposes the 
existence of clearly attributable property rights, because without them, trade and 
exchange are impossible: In Od. 1. 430-432 we are informed that Odysseus father, 
Laertes, had bought a girl as his faithful housekeeper, Eurikleia in exchange for 20 
cows. In Od. 14. 100-105 we are informed of the existence of salaried shepherds 
under the supervision of the chief-shepherd Eumaios. This is an indication of the 
existence of property rights in labour of free persons, as against slaves or medieval 
serfs. In Book 17 (Od. 17. 415-427) indicates the existence of household servants (not 
slaves) who again receive presumably payment in wages or salaries for their labour. In 
Od. 18. 356-364 the possibility of employment as a free labourer in agriculture is 
again attested, when a suitor asked the disguised Odysseus if he would like to work in 
his fields for a large wage.         
 The above indications illuminate the issue of labour provision already in 
Mycenaean and Archaic Greece. Slaves and free remunerated labourers work side by 
side, as was the case also in classical Greece. This thesis is also supported by Forrest 
(1994). Slave labour was not sufficient to cover all needs, so that free men were not 
only working as farmers on their own plots of land, but would find employment as 
salaried persons for various other activities, mainly in agriculture. Hesiod, a 
contemporary of Homer, writing during the second half of the 8th century B.C. (about 
750-720 B.C.) in his Works and Days which can be seen as a farmer’s handbook, 
gives information about his own times, that is Archaic Greece, for the region of 
Boeotia (to the north of Attica). It is clear, that it addresses itself to free farmers, who 
own their own lands and are masters of their produce. Property rights to land and its 
produce are undeniable. Further, the free farmers do not pay any taxes to kings and 
their bureaucracy, as was the case in the Eastern Empires. 
 Hesiod's work contains a lot of ‘moral’ counsels addressed to his brother, 
Perses, but for the benefit of a wide audience, from which we can infer the values, 
norms and customs valid in the emerging macroculture of the Archaic period: Justice 
is paramount. (WD. 210-218, 219-224, 225-228, 248-255). The message here is that 
one should be just and those unjust will receive divine retribution, even if they are 
kings or aristocrats. In WD. 263-269 the task of divine justice is attributed to the 
father of the gods himself, Zeus. This task is so important, that Zeus has a daughter, 
Dike (Justice) who is entrusted with supervising justice. Her task is to plead to Zeus 
cases of injustice among men and ask him to punish them. Dike thus is a forerunner of 
modern ‘attorneys’.  As far as we know, only in the Greek religion of the period do we 
find a ‘specialized’ goddess of justice, which shows the importance that the Greeks 
attributed to justice. Hesiod goes so far as to write (WD. 274-281) that justice is the 
supreme good that Zeus gave to men.       
 Here we can thus establish even a ranking of values during the Archaic Period 
in Greece: Justice is the supreme value. And, of course, justice to safeguard inviolable 
property rights. Zeus will punish (WD. 282-285) unjust acts.
15
 While Days and Works 
does not give us an idea of a clearly established law system, it gives an overall 
impression of an emerging macroculture of customs, norms and values regarding 
justice and property rights. During the next two centuries, linked to the emerging 
                                                 
15 This value system continued and was further deepened during classical times: the playwright 
Menander for example (342-292 B.C.) wrote the famous: ‘ Ἔστιν Δίκης ὀφθαλμός, ὃς τὰ πάνθ’ ὁρᾷ ’ 
(Gnomai Monostichoi, 179) which means that the eye of justice sees everything and nothing –bad or 
illegal- remains unpunished (See Liapis, 2002). Before him, Plato in many of his Dialogues 
(“Euthyphro”) discusses the ideal of justice and the law. (see Allen, 1970). 
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strength of the hoplite warrior-free farmer (Kyriazis and Paparigopoulos, 2011) the 
principle of ‘isonomia’ (equality in front of the law of all free citizens, and in parallel, 
written law and institutionalized courts of justice) will emerge and be supreme. 
Finally, Hesiod informs us that the observance of justice brings prosperity to the city-
state (WD. 213-247).           
 In his second (but probably earlier work) Theogony Hesiod gives additional 
support to the value of justice. In Th. 881-884 Zeus, when he vanquishes the Titans, 
attributes offices to the gods with justice. Further (Th. 901-904) he marries as his 
second wife Themis (Judgment) who bears three daughters, Eunomia (lawfulness), 
Dike (Justice) and Eirene (Peace).
16
 The importance of justice and here also for the 
first time, of the law becomes clear: Not just one, but three goddesses, Themis, Dike 
and Eunomia, are entrusted with the safeguarding of justice and law. We indicated 
above that in Works and Days no indications of the actual laws are to be found. But in 
Theogony the name of the goddess Eunomia (lawfulness) is a clear indication that 
laws (even if as yet unwritten) must have existed and that the principal ‘value’ of the 
law was strong. If not, why should a goddess Eunomia have to exist?  
But apart from these classical texts of Homer and Hesiod, we also have 
indications of an emerging system of property rights from the written Linear B tablets 
that archaeological research revealed in the remains of the Mycenaean palaces. For 
instance, in one of these tablets (Documents, no. 183 Nn 831)  found in  in the 
Mycenaean palace of Pylos we have a description of an economic activity that more 
or less seems to be a trade guild organization (Kirk, 1965:49). These tablets describe a 
case which resembles a company association where seven people from different fields 
and with different skills collaborate and act like partners in a company that produces 
linen for the making of clothes. Among them there are a cowherd, some shepherds, a 
smith and a person who probably was a member of the supreme authority and 
administration of the Kingdom of Pylos (Powell, 1995). Similar organizations were 
also found in the ancient Syrian city of Ugarit (in today’s northwestern Syria).  
Linear A tablets of Minoan Crete are dated back to 1825 B.C. and Linear B 
tablets at about 1500 B.C. (Chandwick, 1958; Davis, 2010). Having in mind the view 
of (North, 2005, 1981) that economic growth is based on established property rights, 
we believe that this primitive kind of company should have flourished during the 
Mycenaean period (1600-1100 B.C.) only in the case of an established system of 
property rights that enables private property in land and capital and secures the 
existence of commercial earnings. This necessary precondition seems to have been 
validated, as modern research proves that during the Mycenaean period private and 
public (state) property co-existed as a forerunner of the forthcoming period of 
classical Athens. 
During the Mycenaean period there had been a system of private land that 
belonged to simple villagers or peasants and separately a ‘Temenos’ (Greek: τέμενος) 
that belonged to the kings, chiefs or nobles and were used as sanctuaries (Antonaccio, 
1995; D’ Amato and Salimbetti, 2011; Kirk, 1965). Private property in land was 
protected by law, while a regime of leasing of land existed too (Promponas, 2006). 
Moreover, individuals who were occupied with land economic activities, such as 
shepherds, had the right to own their own personal flocks, except those that belonged 
to the palace (Halstead, 2007) as well as the autonomy to deal with the central 
administration palace bureaucracy on beneficial terms in order to sell their production 
to the palace (Bendall, 2007; Shelmerdine,  2011). 
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Women too had the right to hold land property, but only those who were 
holding ritual offices. From the Pylos Linear B tablets we also learn that land owners 
had the right to protect their property legally even against public authority. These 
tablets mention the case of a woman priestess and (legal) land owner named Eritha 
who was engaged in a judicial dispute about the status of her property (Shelmerdine, 
2011).
17
 But the element that fully confirms our conclusion that an established system 
of property rights did exist in Mycenaean Greece is the fact that the Palace of Pylos 
had a system somehow like a ‘national cadaster’ already at least from 1200 B.C. 
(Promponas, 2006: 291-292).        
  As a final remark we think that it is necessary to mention the fact that 
Mycenaean society did not have a fully institutionalized regime for safeguarding 
property rights with specific written rules, as was the case for ancient Athens during 
classical period (see Bitros and Karayannis, 2009; Halkos and Kyriazis, 2010), does 
not mean that property rights were not protected in a modern sense. Forrest (1994:67) 
informs as that during the Mycenaean period, property in land was passing from 
generation to generation without a ‘contract’ or any other type of legal title because 
trespassing private land was a very rare phenomenon. Forrest describes this proto-
regime of private property securitization as ‘an undisputable property and not 
undisputable right’.  
 
5.2 Democratic Elements 
 
Jacobsen (1943) has coined, as mentioned above, the contested concept of 
proto-democracies for the Sumerian city-states. Such a situation existed also in the 
Cyclades Islands and on Crete in Greece. The small separate dwellings on the 
Cyclades Islands and on Crete seem to have developed some kind of self-
organization, where some leaders (but not Kings) took over the function of manager 
or coordinator for the provision of public goods like defense in the form of protective 
walls (Doumas and Theoharis, 1970:102-124). It seems that some forms of collective 
decision making took place, and that councils of ‘elders’, as in the Sumerian city 
states, existed, also here (Iakovides, 1970: 266).   
Starting again from evidence in the Iliad, Homer informs us of the existence of 
a council of the Kings (Il. 1. 304-305, Il. 2. 51-56). More important as an indication of 
an emerging proto-democratic spirit, in Il. 2. 85-115, we have an assembly of all 
warriors. Agamemnon wants to have the assembly's approval about the war's 
continuation and puts forward arguments in favour. In Il. 2. 142-165 the assembly 
decides to continue the war, accepting Agamemnon's arguments and proposal.  And 
the above is not as isolated example. In Il. 2, 278-304 Odysseus steps forward in front 
of the warriors assembly, asking for patience followed by Nestor. The Trojans also 
have a similar assembly, as made clear in Il.2. 773-778 when the goddess Iris finds 
them assembled. The practice of the gods mirrors the practice of men (or is it the other 
way round?). In Il l. 4. 1-19 the gods hold an assembly in order to decide what to do 
concerning the war. Zeus speaks and proposes, subject to the agreement of the other 
gods, that they should intermediate in order to bring peace, by giving back to 
Menelaus his stolen wife, Helen.       
 The above is very important first because it shows that the supreme god, Zeus 
does not just decide and impose his decision, but proposes. The 12 gods, in an 
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assembly, discuss and decide democratically. This god's assembly predates and finds a 
parallel in the famous assembly of the Athenian generals a few hours before the battle 
of Marathon: The ten democratically elected by the citizens assembly generals vote 
democratically in favour or against the battle (Green, 1998). Second, female 
goddesses (6 as against 6 male) participate fully and equally in the assembly, with full 
‘voting rights’, a situation that human women would not achieve and only in a few 
countries till the beginning of the twentieth century. This equality is so strong, that 
Hera does not hesitate to publicly castigate her husband Zeus accusing him of hiding 
some of his talks (with Achilles mother Thetis.) She calls him (Il. 1. 539-544) 
‘treacherous one, what god has been plotting counsels with you?’    
 Third, the gods are not far-away beings, unconcerned by human affairs. On the 
contrary, they care for them, mix with humans (in battle and sexually) and try to help 
them but never impose their will as autocrats. In all Greek religion, gods can be 
friends, counselors, lovers or enemies of humans, but never blind natural forces or 
autocrats, who do not care about men (De Romilly, 1999: 38-39, 49-56). Even victory 
is celebrated in an equalitarian way: In (Il. 7. 312-320) the Greeks celebrate Ajax's 
victory over Hector, by eating a five-year old male ox. Everybody gets an equal share 
of the meat, with the exception of Ajax, who is the honored person and gets the choice 
morsel.           
 In Il. 8. 489-497 it is Hector who calls the Trojan assembly to discuss next 
day’s and plans, and in Il.  9. 9-18 Agamemnon calls the Greek assembly where plans 
and proposals are discussed. The chief’s assembly is repeated in Books 10 and 14 (Il. 
10. 196-253, Il. 14. 61-75), while in (Il. 19. 34-35, 42-45 and 45-153) Achilles mother 
proposes to him to convene the assembly in order to try to find a solution to his 
quarrel with Agamemnon. Homer mentions explicitly that in this assembly participate 
also the ‘oikonomoi’ (those in charge with logistics, in other worlds, the stewards in 
modern terminology), those who distribute wheat (again from the administration 
branch of the army), the steersmen and those in charge of the ships safety. And in Il. 
20. 4-25, Zeus calls again a gods assembly. The description of all these democratic-
style procedures resemble those of the classical Athenian assembly, where an orator-
politician, proposes and the citizen’s assembly approves or rejects by majority vote 
which may be counted.        
 However, some scholars believe that these war assemblies that included both a 
king and a council were primarily consultative to the Achaean Kings (Congleton, 
2011; Pitsoulis, 2011) while others argue that this presence of a council that consisted 
of land-holding nobles  provided to the Mycenaean Kings some kind of feudal service 
(D’ Amato and Salimbetti, 2011). However, the variety of the examples of 
‘democratic’ procedures we have already described here make us believe that, 
although Mycenaean war assemblies were not structurally similar in nature to the 
Greek democratic assemblies from the 6
th
 to the 3
th
 B.C. classical period and 
predominantly that of Athens, they can certainly  be described as ‘precursors’ of the 
Athenian classical assembly. 
Traces of ‘democratic’ values during the Mycenaean period continue in the 
Odyssey, (Od. 1. 80-95, 272-275, 371-372). Goddess Athena goes to Ithaca and 
proposes to Telemachus that he calls an assembly of his fellow citizens to ask for their 
protection against the predations of the suitors of his fortune). In Od 2. 6-21, an old 
man, Aegyptius, speaks first. This is a clear parallel to the importance of the elders as 
counselors in the assembly, as suggested by Jacobsen (1943) for the Sumerian city-
states and Wolf (1947) for the Jewish city-states. The assembly is described in detail 
by Homer, and it is clear that all interested members are entitled to speak: the accuser, 
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Telemachus, Eurymachus as the spokesman of the defendants, Aegyptius and 
Alitherses as representatives of the elders and mediators. All of them try to swing the 
popular assembly in their favour, which is an indication of its emerging strength. 
 Were we not to know its actual context, the description could very well apply 
to a classical period Athenian popular court, as described in many speeches of the 
Attic orators, Demosthenes, Lysias, Aischines etc.
18
 In this Book Homer really 
anticipates history by two and half centuries. And, fittingly, Odyssey closes as it 
begins, with an assembly after the killing of the suitors which has to attribute the 
rights and wrongs and try to avoid a civil war. Another proto-democratic element, 
present also in the Odyssey, is that of simple men speaking on equal terms and even 
being uncivil in criticizing aristocrats and Kings. The swineherd Eumaeus and the 
disguised as a beggar Odysseus do not hesitate to criticize and even verbally abuse 
one of the suitors, Antinous (Od. 17. 307-487), who may have been the son of one of 
Ithaca’s neighbour kingdoms. Such a situation is unthinkable between a simple man 
and a contemporary Eastern Emperor.
19
      
 Lastly, Thersites again. The case we have analyzed above (proponent of justice 
and protection of property rights) is an example relatively similar to the process of 
free speech in front of an assembly, what would become in the classical period, the 
principle of ‘isegoria’ (equality of speech), one of the founding values of direct 
democracy. Thersites speaks freely, in front of the army and the Kings. This again is 
the first step that culminates in the famous dictum of the Athenian classical period 
assembly: τὶς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται; ‘who wants to speak’? Traces of democratic values 
by trying to interpret the Thersites episode have also been detected by Ferguson 
(1973:11), who believes that ‘Thersites, cruelly caricatured and ruthlessly 
manhandled, is the beginning of a democratic opposition to aristocratic misuse of 
power’ and by Johnston (1988) who regards Thersites behavior as a ‘logical, 
humanitarian and democratic objection’.      
 Balot (2001: 66-67) also considers Thersites as a ‘remote glimmer of proper 
egalitarianism’ while Stuurman (2004:173) asserts that the Thersites incident indicates 
that Achaean Greek warriors were not obliged to obey blindly the orders of their war 
and political leaders, but ‘soldiers worth for something’. He also considers the 
incident as one of the first public expressions of political equality. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
By analyzing the main literary texts of the 8
th
 century we have traced two 
elements of the emerging democratic macroculture, in religion, war and the economy: 
the principles of ‘isonomia’ (equality in front of the law) mainly in safeguarding 
property rights, and also as justice, and ‘isegoria’ (freedom and equality of speech) in 
front of the assembly, either of warriors (Iliad) or citizens (the people) in the Odyssey.  
Greek religion shows a marked difference from Eastern ones: From the 
examples we have analyzed it becomes clear that it is a ‘democratic’ religion based on 
the principle of equality of the gods (men and women) with Zeus as ‘primus inter 
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 In contrast with the Greek case, eastern civilizations of the Mycenaean era and afterwards were 
characterized by the belief that king’s orders had a divine origin and legalization and thus should have 
been accepted by people with absolute respect (Puett, 2008). Babylonian and Persian Kings, though did 
not deify themselves, demanded that their orders to be regarded as ‘decisions of the gods’ Ehrenberg 
(2008) and Puett (2008:13)  also inform us that Egyptian and Japanese emperors were regarded as ‘sons 
of the heavens’, meaning that they had a divine origin.  
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pares’ and coordinator, but certainly not an autocrat. The values of ‘isegoria’, justice 
and law are paramount, so much that three goddesses (Dike, Eunomia and Thetis) are 
entrusted with the various aspects of implementing and safeguarding them. Further, 
men are portrayed as having free will (Romilly, 1999: 38-39). In Greek religion no 
official priesthood existed, as in Egypt or the temple rule of ancient Summeria ‘a 
totalitarian religious belief’ (Kriwaczek, 2010: 53).20 In Greek religion there is not 
one supreme absolute god, like the Persian Ahura-Mazda, so that emperors could 
claim to be their representatives on earth (as the Babylonian, Assyrian, Persian 
emperors and the Egyptian Pharaohs did).
21
    
Thus, Greek religion, with free will, democratic elements and no established 
priesthood shows some similarities with protestant religions in the value system it 
promotes. Table 2 summarizes the political situation in various periods and states 
during antiquity. It shows that only in the case of classical Greece the traces of 
democratic participation that had also appeared during the Bronze Age and later 
periods among many other Eastern nations were finally transformed into a real 
democratic political regime, such as that of classical Athens. Religious beliefs and 
actual practices of Mycenaean and Archaic periods are one element in forming values, 
norms and customs of a macroculture favorable to the emergence of democracy. In 
Kyriazis and Metaxas (2010) and Kyriazis and Paparrigopoulos (2011) a different 
element of macroculture was analyzed, that of the emerging (again during the Archaic 
period) heavy infantryman hoplite and the phalanx formation. There too, the 
egalitarian element was predominant. 
Our argument thus is that probably even during the Mycenaean period, but 
more certainly during the Archaic, there were different elements, in religion, warfare 
but also in the Athletic Games, that all evolved similar values and norms, of equality, 
justice, freedom of speech, safeguarding of property rights and individualism. The 
reason we refer to the athletic games aspect, like the Olympiads is because we believe 
that they represent another element of macroculture that promoted equality, and thus 
also democracy. It is an area which we intend to analyze in a forthcoming paper. 
These values in religion, warfare but also in the Athletic Games are being 
continuously developed during the Archaic Age in Greece, as can be glimpsed also in 
the poets of the period (Schefold, 1992; Pitsoulis, 2011). According to bounded 
rationality, values, norms and customs emerging and developed into one or more 
fields, involving cognitive learning, are taken over in other fields. As presented in our 
model, in our case, the values of ‘isonomia’ and ‘isegoria’ present in religion, in 
warfare, in athletic contests, are integrated into a new macroculture, that makes the 
emergence of democracy a possibility.  
We have tried to show that these elements probably existed already in the 
Mycenaean period, but certainly and in strength during the Archaic period. Table 3 
summarizes this argument. What was different in Greece from the the other 
contemporary Middle Eastern states were 1) In Middle Eastern countries these 
elements did not exist 2) If they existed, as per Jacobsen (1943) in the ancient 
Sumerian city-states, they were not strong, or numerous enough to mutually support 
each other and be integrated into a macroculture conducive to democracy. So, in all 
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Christianity and Islam. We owe this comment to professors Bertram Schefold and George Tridimas. 
However, we believe that this kind of further research would make us diverge from the main focus of 
our current research, because comparing ancient greek religious doctrines with those of Christianity 
and Islam is too far away from the period we are analyzing and not our main focus. 
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other known cases, the historic development was towards authoritarian empires and 
not towards democracy.  
 
    
Table 2. The Development of Government Types 
Country Periods and Government type 
Country 
Bronze Age (3000-1200 
B.C) 
Early Iron Age 
1200-800 B.C. 
Geometric Age 
(Greece) 
800-500 B.C. 
Classical Age 
(Greece) 
500-300 B.C. 
Egypt 
k and c.a. Old Kingdom 
(3000-1674) 
k and c.a. Middle Kingdom 
(1674-1565) 
k and c.a. New Kingdom 
(1565-1085) 
k and c.a. 
(New 
Kingdom to 
1085 B.C.) 
k and c.a. (following 
dynasties) 
k and c.a. 
Sumer city states 
k and p.e. (3000-2300) 
k and c.a. (2300-2100) 
- - - 
Babylon k and c.a. (1900-1600) k and c.a. k and c.a. (700-539) - 
Assur k and c.a (1813-1076)→ 
k. and c.a. 
(1076-911)→ 
k and c.a. (911-612)→ - 
Israel k and p.e K and p.e - - 
Hittites k and c.a. (1350-1190) - - - 
Ancient Hellas 
(Greek city-
states) 
k and p.e. (3000-1280) 
k and p.e. 
(1280-800) 
k and p.e. (800-500) 
k, o, and d.d. 
(macroculture 
effect in war, 
religion and 
sports) 
Troy 
k and p.e. (3000-1900) 
k and p.e  (1900-1250) 
- - - 
Persia - - - 
k and c.a. (546-
331) 
Explanations: 
c.a. : centralist-autocracy regime 
p.e. : some elements of democratic participation, like council of elders, army assemblies, etc. 
d.d. : direct democracy 
k : kingships 
o :  oligarchs  
Sources: Wolf (1947) for Israel, Healy (1991) for Assyria, Healy (1992) for New Kingdom 
Egypt, Fileds (2004) for Troy, , D’ Amato and Salimbetti (2011) for Mycenaean Greece, 
Kriwaczek, (2010) for Middle East chronology, Puett (2008) for Persia and De Romilly 
(1999) and Cartledge (2009) for classical Greece. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the argument. We show here that what was different in 
Greece was the emergence of various elements of a macroculture, warfare, religion, 
city-state environment and athletic games that evolved similar proto-democratic 
values. Two of them were missing entirely from other contemporary cultures: the 
heavily armed self-financed (for his arms) infantryman (hoplite) and the athletic 
games, while the other two, religion and city-states existed in some other cultures, but 
in different and weaker forms. Eastern religion either pluralistic (as in Egypt and 
Mesopotamia) or monotheistic (as in Persia and Israel) had established priesthoods 
and were in most aspects authoritarian.      
 The four elements of the macroculture coalesced into a coherent whole by the 
end of the Archaic period, as illustrated in phase 4 in our model (figure 2), forming 
19 
 
the basis for the emergence of democracy. Very important from the economic point of 
view, the ancient Greek democracies protected strongly property rights, especially 
land ownership, but in more developed economies, like that of classical Athens, also 
others, like trading, inheritance and financial-monetary rights. (protection against 
monetary fraud by Nicophon’s law and through the establishment of ‘independent’ 
law courts for trade, inheritance disputes etc.
22
 Protection of property rights had a 
strong contribution to the economic development and flourishing of the classical 
Athenian economy (Cohen, 1997; Halkos and Kyriazis, 2010; Ober, 2008). 
 
Table 3: The emergence of a democratic macroculture 
Emerging macroculture elements ‘Cognitive glue’ 
Democratic   
macroculture 
                      Mycenaean and Archaic Greece 
               
 
Warfare: (hoplites and phalanx) 
Equality, trust, self-confidence, 
isegoria 
 
            
  
 
 
Via 
Bounded 
rationality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Integration of previous 
elements into political 
fields: isonomia, 
isegoria, isopoliteia 
(political equality), 
justice, laws and rules, 
‘omonoia’ (unanimity) 
trust-self confidence 
Religion: equality, justice, isonomia 
and isegoria ‘laws’ 
 
Athletic games: equality, ‘rules’, 
justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
City-state environment: low 
transaction cost for coordination and 
cooperation mechanisms, 
 trust, self-confidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of Ancient Athens, we have a parallel development of political 
values and economic ‘rights’ (especially property rights). The flourishing of 
democracy was based on sound economic institutions and economic strength. Taken 
                                                 
22
 It must be pointed out that the principle of ‘isonomia’ concerning property rights was respected in 
most cases also in oligarchic (like pre-democratic 6
th
 century Athens and Aegina), mixed (like Sparta) 
city-states, and Kingdoms (like Macedon).  For the peculiar structure of the Spartan city-state political 
institutions see Cartledge (1978: 34) and Rhodes (2007: 58-61). 
20 
 
together, the elements summarized in Table 3, brought about political and economic 
structural change, leading to the emergence of direct democracy and market 
economies in some city-states, a unique phenomenon up to that time.
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